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SWINGERS:
MORALITY LEGISLATION AND THE LIMITS OF
STATE POLICE POWER
RAYMONDKU'

1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of this century, Justice Louis Brandeis defined the
constitutional right to privacy as "the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.") The
eloquence of Justice Brandeis' statement, however, belies the difficulty
society and courts have had in defining this most "comprehensive of
rights." From abortion' to sodomy,' we have struggled with the limits of
governmental power to intrude into our personal lives, activities and
decision-making. Nowhere is this struggle clearer than in issues involving
human sexuality. Laws criminalizing fornication, sodomy, adultery and
prostitution have drawn the fire of activists; litigants' and academics!
... Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; Director, Center for Law,
Technology & Communications; AB., Brown University; J.D., New York University School of
Law; Fellow, Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program (1994-95),
I would like to thank Sylvia Law for her thoughtful comments and continued support, the
editors of the St. Thomas Law Review and my research assistants Carlos Cabrera and David
Majchrak for their assistance. I would especially like to thank Melissa whose support, feedback
and patience makes this all possible.
I. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that a statute prohibiting abortion
except when necessary to save the mother's life was unconstitutional); see also Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (finding that statute placing limitations on
abortion is constitutional so long as it does not unduly interfere with a woman's right to have an
abortion).
3. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (hnlding that homosexuals do
not have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1999)
(concluding that Georgia's sodomy statute violated the right of privacy conferred by the state
constitution).
4. Laws criminalizing conduct such as sodomy and fornication have been repealed or struck
down in over half the states. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION I\ND THE
LAW §1I.OI(2) at 11-8 (1992); see also RICHARDA. POSNER & KATHERINEB. SILBAUGH,A
GUIDETO AMERICA'SSEXLAWS98-102 (1996).
5. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (N'Y. 1980) (striking down a
sodomy and deviant sexual intercourse statute); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 49-50
(Fa. 1980) (striking down a law prohibiting voluntary deviate sexual intercourse); Gryczan v.
State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (striking down laws prohibiting deviate sexual conduct); Powell
v, State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (striking down Georgia's sodomy statute).
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Unfortunately, at the end of this century and the dawn of a new
millennium we are no closer to understanding the limits of governmental
power or the boundaries of the right to be let alone. Instead, despite
"[m[uch judicial and scholarly ink [that] has been spilt in the task of
expounding this paradoxical right,'" what has emerged is a hodgepodge of
rules and fact specific inquiries.'
The struggle over privacy and human sexuality came to the fore, once
again, when in the early morning hours of February 1999, the Florida,
Broward County Sheriffs Office (BSO) raided Trapeze II, a member only,
on-premise swingers' club'
Apparently, the BSO received a tip that
prostitution was occurring at the club." However, the initial undercover
officers, who entered the club representing that they desired to be members,
did not find prostitution; instead, they found couples engaging in sexual
intercourse."
Trapeze II, which includes a bar, buffet, dance floor and
game room, also provides separate back rooms in which the officers
observed married couples having sex with their own spouses in view of
other club members. Despite finding no evidence of prostitution, the police
returned in force and arrested twenty-four patrons and employees, charging
them with criminallewdness.12
The club owners and employees were also
charged with operating an establishment for the purposes of lewdness."

6. See generally David AJ. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HAST. L.J. 957
(1979); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624
(1979-80); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and
Extramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1660 (1991); Michael E. Malarnut, Proposal for Revision
of Archaic Statutes implicating Private Consensual Noncommercial Adult Sexual Conduct, 3
LAW & SEX45 (1993).
7. LAURENCEH. TRIBE,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONAL LAW §15-1 (2d. ed. 1988).
8. U?der the U.S. Supreme Court's current test, the right to privacy protects onJy those
pe~onal rights that are deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
ns
Pt
Adult Theater Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. ] 13, 152
( 973)) '. Correspondmgl~, efforts have been made to demonstrate how particular sexual conduct
?r declSl.onscan be considered fundamental in light of the specific traditions surrounding the act
m question. ~ee Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (concluding that there is no
fundamental right to engage in same sex sodomy).
9. See Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Raiding Sex Clubs Not a Priority Broward Says MIAMI
~ERAL.D., Feb. 19, 1999, at 3B; see also Paul Brinkley-Rogers, SWinger~ Club Member: Told to
J/zpe;; l~ COll.rl,MIAMT HERALD, March 15, 1999; Swingers Clubs D~fend Right to Share it All:
e ol,feratIOn of the Spouse~Swapping Establishments has Led to 55 Lewd-Activity Arrests in
BGrowardCounty, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 1999, at 84; Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Broward &
omorrah, MIAMlHERALD, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1M.
10. See ~aul Brinkley - Rogers, Raiding Sex Clubs, supra note 9.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
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These arrests followed a prior BSO raid of a swingers' club, Athena's
Forum, three weeks earlier." Following these two raids, Broward Sheriff
Ken Jenne stated that "I do not want us to cultivate the image of being the
morality police. We're not ... but we still need to send a message out
there.':" The message could not be clearer. Because no one was being
harmed by the swingers' conduct and that conduct did not intrude upon the
rights of any third parties, the swingers were being prosecuted solely
because their conduct was considered immoral.
This article examines whether Florida can legitimately convict the
swingers pursuant to the Florida Constitution specifically, and principles of
constitutional law in general, and concludes that it cannot. In so doing, this
article does not attempt to define privacy or to provide a taxonomy of
activities that fall within its reach, which has been done quite thoroughly by
others." The swingers' conduct clearly falls within what scholars have
characterized as the right to sexual autonomy, personhood and freedom of
association." However, rather than simply reiterating what those authors
have said and applying it to the novel facts of this case, this article asks the
preliminary and more fundamental question of whether the state and U.S.
constitutions give the government the power to regulate the swingers'
conduct in particular and sexual morality in general. Hofeldian corollaries
aside," there is a subtle but important difference between the questions:
Does the government have the power to criminalize X? And do I have the
right to do X?19 In addition to refocusing the terms of the debate, focusing
on whether government has been given the power is required by what I
have argued elsewhere are the first principles underlying American
Constitutionalism: I) a constitution represents the will of the people as a
whole, and 2) powers granted by a constitution must, therefore, either
command the actual unanimous support of the people or be adopted
through mechanisms designed to approximate the will of the people as a
whole." Asking whether a consensus exists for the principle that a
particular act or right is fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty and therefore, should be free from a particular exercise of
14. See id.
15. rd.
16. See supra note 6; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
15-1 (2d ed. 1988).
17. See supra note 6.
18. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALEL.J. 16 (1913-14).
19. See id.
20. See Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change,
64 FORDHAML. REv. 535,565-69 (1995).
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governmental power presupposes that a consensus exists giving
government the power in the first place. As this article demonstrates, that
assumption is not only unwarranted, but is unconstitutional as well.
Part 11 of this article examines whether Florida's laws against
committing lewdness apply to the swingers in this case. While the Florida
Supreme Court has always limited the punishment of lewd acts to
circumstances in which the persons engaged in the conduct under
consideration invade the rights of third persons, recent lower court
decisions have moved in the direction of eliminating any requirement of
injury to third parties. If the lower courts' interpretations are applied to the
swingers, it would represent an effort to criminalize behavior solely to
uphold a particular moral view. Part III concludes that government does
not have the power to regulate individual conduct under those
circumstances unless the people as a whole have granted that power to the
government. Lastly, part IV examines whether the regulation of sexual
conduct is justified under the states' police power and concludes that in the
absence of an invasion of the rights of others, the states do not have the
power to regulate the swingers. As demonstrated below, this conclusion is
consistent with the doctrinal limits of the police powers of the states under
both federal and state constitutional law.
1I. THE OFFENSE OF LEWDNESS
Florida, like many states," punishes individuals for lewd and
lascivious behavior pursuant to numerous statutory provisions and under a
variety of circumstances." For example, section 798.02 of the Florida
statutes provides, in pertinent part, that "if any man or woman, married or
unmarried, engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior,
they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.':" What
constitutes "lewd and lascivious behavior," however, is not defined by
statute. The courts, therefore, are required to give those terms content.
Pnor to the prosecution of the swingers in this case, the Florida Supreme
Court consistentlv mterpreted "lewd and lascivious behavior" to mean "an
intentional act of sexual indulgence or public indecency, when such act

21. See generally Minor v. State, 501 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)' People v Darryl M
475 ,N.y.S.2d 704 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984); People v. Rylaarsdam, 181 Cal.' Rptr. 723 (Cal. Ap~:
Dep t Super. Ct. 1982); Smith v. City of Huntsville, 515 So. 2d 72 (Ala Cri
A
1986)'
People v, Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646 (UI. 1997).
.
m. pp.
,
22. See,. e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 796.07(2)(e) (1999) (making it unlawful "[t]o offer to commit
.
'.
,
. .' " engage In, prost1tutlOn, lewdness or assignation"); PtA STAT. ch. 798.02
(1999) (cnnunahzmg open and gross lewdness under certain circumstances)
23. FLA. STAT.ch. 798.02 (1999).
.
or to comnut or to

?
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causes offense to one or more persons viewing it or otherwise intrudes
upon the rights of others.'?' In contrast, more recent lower court decisions
appear to eliminate this requirement. 25 As the following demonstrates, the
swingers could only be sanctioned for lewdness as defined by the lower
courts, and it is that potentially new definition that raises constitutional
concerns.
A. THE FLORIDA SUPREMECOURT

From the beginning, the Florida Supreme Court has carefully limited
the scope of laws punishing lewdness." As demonstrated by the following
discussion of three relevant Florida Supreme Court decisions, "[a]cts are
neither 'lewd' nor 'lascivious' unless they substantially intrude upon the
rights of others.''" In Pitchford v. State," the court's earliest reported
decision interpreting the statutory prohibition against lewd conduct, the
defendants were prosecuted for engaging in sexual intercourse for a period
expanding for more than two years." The defendants, Pitchford, a married
white man, and Clerk, an unmarried black woman occasionally employed
as a field worker by Pitchford, were found in a state of undress in Clerk's
bedroom by members of the sheriffs office."
In reversing their
convictions, the court defined the crime of "open and gross lewdness and
lascivious behavior" as "such conduct as would bring upon a husband and
wife the penalty of the statute. It must be 'open and gross lewdness and
lascivious behavior,' extremely indecent, immoral, and offensive'?' While
the court found the defendants' conduct to be "reprehensible," either
because it was adulterous, unmarried or interracial, it was not the type of
conduct prohibited by the statute." In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied heavily on the fact that the prosecution's principal witness testified
that "no one could see into the room through the windows without going
very close and peering in," and that he could not observe the defendants
24. Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1991) (holding that acts are lewd or lascivious
only when they intrude upon the rights of others); see also Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351 (Fla.
1973) (stating that the lascivious acts need not be performed in "public," but rather only in the
presence of one or more persons) (quoting Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675, 678 (Fla.
1971)); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency, etc. § I (1995); infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part lI.B.
26. See FLA. STAT. ch. 798.02 (1999).
27. Schmitt, 590 So. 2d at 410.
28. 65 Fla. 147 (Fla. 1913).
29. See Pitchford v. State, 65 Fla. 147, 147 (Fla. 1913).
30. See id. at 148.
31. Id. at 147-48 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 149.
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until he entered Clerk's bedroom." The court also concluded that,
although people saw Pitchford visit Clerk's house in broad daylight, that
fact was insufficient to sustain the conviction." Accordingly, Pitchford
stands for the proposition that, at the very least to sustain a conviction for
lewd conduct, the state must demonstrate that the defendants engaged in
extremely indecent, immoral and offensive conduct that was actually
observed by outsiders, The fact that outsiders might know what is going on
behind closed doors and disapprove is insufficient.
The Florida Supreme Court further clarified the definition of "lewd
and lascivious" in Chesebrough v. State. 35 The court affirmed the
convictions of a husband and a wife for engaging in sexual intercourse in
the presence of their minor child for the purpose of demonstrating
procreation." Initially, the court noted that the words lewd and lascivious
are synonymous with an "unlawful indulgence of lust, signifying that form
of immorality which has a relation to sexual impurity ... gross indecency
with respect to sexual relations.':" The obvious circularity of this initial
definition aside, the Court's opinion goes on to further clarify the scope of
the offense, According to the Court, the predecessor of the statutes
punishing lewdness was the COmmon law offense of open and public
indecency." The statutes modified the common law by making it "no
longer necessary that such act be committed in a public place or in the
presence of many people.':" Instead, it broadened the offense to include
acts "offensive to one or more persons present."? Additionally, in
rejecting constitutional challenges based upon overbreadth and the right to
privacy, the court explained that individuals are not at liberty to engage "in
sexual intercourse at such times and places as the parties may desire and in
the presence of others.?" Accordingly, while there was no evidence that
the defendants' child was offended by the conduct of his parents, the state
could certainly act in the interest of protecting the child as parens patriae:"
As the court has recognized elsewhere, "it is evident beyond all doubt that
any type of sexual conduct involving a child constitutes an intrusion upon
the rights of that child, whether or not the child consents and whether or not
33.

rd,

34.

See id.

35,
36.
37.
38,
39.
40.
41.
42.

255 So, 2d675 (Fla. 1971).
See Chesebrough v. State, 255 So, 2d 675, 679 (Fla. 1971).
fd. at 677.
See id. at 678.
rd.
rd.
Id. at 679.
See Chesebrough, 255 So, 2d 677-79,
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that conduct originates from a parent.?"
Despite the court's recognition that the statute expanded the COmmon
law prohibition, the limited nature of that expansion is made clear by the
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Chesebrough. While
the dissent agreed that the statute was facially constitutional, Justice Ervin
disagreed that it could be constitutionally
applied to the parents in
question."
According to Justice Ervin, "I don't believe the statute was
intended to invade the privacy of a family and a private home, as here, and
criminalize the acts of the mother and father."" For the dissent, therefore,
regardless of the wisdom of the parents' actions, the fact that they took
place in their home and not in a public place placed the conduct beyond the
reach of the state." In light of the dissent, the court's opinion is best
understood as recognizing the diminished importance of where the conduct
occurred, focusing instead on whether the conduct invades the rights of any
third parties that may be present.
The diminished importance of where the conduct occurs and the
increased focus on whether the rights of others are being intruded upon is
also apparent in Campbell v. State"
Campbell was a waiter at Robbie's
Yum Yum Tree Lounge, an establishment frequented by gay men." At
approximately 2:00 a.m. on the weekend of July 4, 1974, undercover police
who were aware that a gay gathering was occurring in the area observed
Campbell fondle a fully clothed patron in the public area of the Yum Yum
Tree."
In reversing Campbell's
conviction, the court reiterated the
"extremely indecent" requirement articulated in Pitchford and concluded
that whatever that term means, it requires more than fondling a member of
the same sex." Moreover, the court questioned "who in the dark and
crowded recesses of the Yum Yum Tree at 2:00 a.m. on July 6, 1974, was
'offended'?""
As such, it concluded that no reasonable person could have
concluded that the defendant's conduct "at the time and place and under the
circumstances it occurred constituted" criminal lewdness."
Under the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, it would appear

43. Schmitt, 590 so. 2d at 410-11.
44. See Chesebrough, 255 So. 2d at 679 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
45.

ld.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See
331
See
See
See
ld.
Jd.

id.
So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1976).
Campbell v. State, 331 So. 2d 289, 289 (Fla. 1976).
id.
id. at 289-90.
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that the Florida courts are unable to convict the swingers of lewdness. First
and foremost, there is absolutely no evidence that the swingers' sexual acts
offended anyone present or, as there appears to be no claim that mentally
incompetent individuals or children were present, otherwise intruded upon
the rights of third parties.
Chesebrough
is, therefore, clearly
distinguishable from this case. Moreover, as in Pitchford, the fact that
members of the communitymay have observed people entering and leaving
the club and suspected that sex was occurring therein does not constitute an
invasion of protected rights." Similarly, Campbell demonstrates that
whether or not the undercover officers may have been offended is
irrelevant." In that case, the question was whether anyone else at the Yum
Yom Tree was offended, not whether the police were offended." With
respect to Trapeze II, who was offended by the conduct of the club
members in the early morning hours of February 7, 1999? Given that the
members of such organizations join specifically because they share a
common belief in the swinging lifestyle, it would be hard to argue that
anyone was offended."
Furthermore, the acts in question took place in the confines of a
private room in a private club otherwise hidden from non-club members."
As in Pitchford, there was simply no way to be exposed to the sexual
conduct in question short of actively seeking it out. For example, in order
to even observe the activities in question, the undercover officers of BSO
I) represented that they desired to be members of the club, 2) represented
that they were not offended by nudity or sexual activity, 3) left the main
rooms of the club to enter the private rooms, 4) undressed in a locker room,
and 5) entered the restricted areas of the club." The degree to which the
general public was protected from unintentional viewing of these activities
would suggest that the swingers' argument, that no reasonable person could
conclude that. their conduct "at the time and place and under the
CIrcumstances It occurred" constituted criminal lewdness , is even more
53. See Pitchford, 65 Fla. at 149.
54". See Campbell v. State, 331 So. 2d 289, 290 (Fla. 1976). Moreover,

leaving the

~et~~natlOn,of whether ~ part~cular a~t~anbe considered lewd to the subjective sensibilities of
mdlVldual police offic~r:' 15an rmpemussible delegation of power. See Chicago v. Morales, 119

S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (striking down an Illinois law against loitering as unconstitutionally vague).
55. See Campbell, 331 So. 2d 290.
56 Till .
.
S IS not to say that there are no circumstances under Which members of Athena's
Fo~~ or Trapeze II could be offended by activities occurring between other members.
lndlVlduals w~o~har~a belief in exhibitionism, nudism and "swapping" could well be offended
by acts of bestiality, violence, or mutilation.
57. See Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Steamy Testimony COUrt Hears Tales of Sex at Adult Club,
MIAMIHERALD,
Sep. 11, 1999, at lB.
58. See id.

_
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persuasive than the defendant's in Campbell, where the conduct occurred in
the public area of a restaurant/bar in which members of the general public
easily could have inadvertently observed the sexual contact. Consequently,
under Florida Supreme Court precedent, it would appear that Florida will
not be able to establish the required intrusion upon the rights of others."
B.

THE FLORIDA DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

In light of the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the crime of
lewdness, on what basis were the charges brought against the swingers in
the first place? It would appear that the Broward County prosecutors are
relying upon lower court interpretations of lewdness in the context of
soliciting, engaging or committing prostitution."
As the following
discussion demonstrates, it is possible to interpret these cases as punishing
conduct that does not intrude upon the rights of others.
In State v. Conforti." the defendant was convicted of lewdness for
dancing, masturbating and performing cunnilingus upon another woman:'
An undercover police officer entered Studio XXX and paid for a "two
female entertainment package," and upon entering a private room, he left a
tip of $120 for the dancers who then began their performance." In
rejecting a First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth challenge, the
court relied upon Schmitt and Chesebrough for the proposition that
lewdness has a "sufficiently narrow meaning" under Florida law." The
court then went on to reject the defendant's privacy argument by
concluding that he could have no legitimate expectation of privacy because
there "can be no right to patronize a commercial establishment to buy a
live, lewd performance.""

59. Additionally, from what little information is contained in the public record, it would also
appear that the conduct the swingers were actually engaged in could not be characterized as
"extremely indecent" in the absence of any invasion of the rights of others. As stated in
Pitchford, the conduct must be such that it would subject a husband and wife to criminal sanction.
See Pitchford v. State, 65 Fla. 146, 147-48 (1913). It would appear that the only sexual activity
observed by BSO was "conventional" sexual intercourse between individuals with their own
spouses. Whatever "extremely indecent" means, it must require more than demonstrated in the
swingers' case.
60. See FLA. STAT. ch. 796.07(1)(b), (3)(a) (1985) (defining lewdness as "any indecent nr
obscene act" and making it unlawful "[tlc offer to commit, or to commit, or to engage in,
prostitution, lewdness, or assignation").
61. 688 So. 2d 350 (Fla. DiS!. C,- App. 1997).
62. See State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 353 (Fla. Dis'- C,- App. 1997).
63.

See id.

64. !d. at 357.
65. Id. at 358.

;;oow
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Similarly, in State v. Davis," the court rejected a first amendment
challenge to a lewdness conviction for lapdancing."
As in Conforti, the
defendant in Davis performed sexual acts, danced topless, encouraged the
officer to masturbate and allowed the officer to place his hand on her inner
thigh." Once again all these acts occurred in a private room where
,
.
69
members of the general public could not observe what was occurrmg.
Accordingly, these cases stand for the proposition that some acts of
lewdness are punishable, even in the absence of both offense and intrusion
upon rights of those present.
Obviously, because these cases involve commercial transactions, they
are immediately distinguishable from the swingers' case. In both Davis
and Conforti, the defendants engaged in the underlying acts in exchange for
money, and both courts relied upon the commercial nature of the
transaction to reject the "as applied" challenges.'o As the Conforti court
noted, "the right to privacy applies to personal matters, and not to
commercial ventures or transactions."'! In contrast, the swingers' acts were
in no way related to a commercial venture or transaction.
There is no
evidence of any financial quid pro quo arrangement for sex, either among
the members or between the club owners and the various members.
Consequently, it would appear that the prostitution line of cases simply
does not apply to the swingers. Despite this obvious difference, Florida's
Case law in this area is muddled, with the commercial cases constantly
cross-referencing the non-commercial lewdness cases and most recently,
also intermingling prosecution of nude dancers underthe non-commercial
provision."
It would appear, therefore, that the prosecutor in the swingers' cases
would argue for an expansive interpretation of these lower court decisions
involving dancers. Ignoring the commercial nature of the acts in those
cases, the decisions do not require that the act intrude upon the rights of
66. 623 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

Wa~~;
:;~;:~dv49~a~~
'
'.
'

6;3 So. 2d 622, 623-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also State v.
,02 (Fla. Dlst. Ct. App. 1993).
68
. See DavJS, 623 So. 2d at 623.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 624' see I Sta
.
(en bane).
'
a so
te v, Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
71. Conforti, 688 So 2d t 358'
.
unconstitutionality of secti~n79:
' se~ als.o Davis., 623 S~. 2d .at 624 ("[~]he clalm~
compelling interest'
tlawi .07(3~ as.VIolatIng the 11ght ofpnvacy IS at odds with the state s
such conduct involv: ~~ s:~
prOS.htu~on,
assignati?n and lewd behavior, particularly where
72 r- S
e 0 se!VIces In a commercial enterprise ")
. oee tate v. Coyle 718 So 2d 21
..
section 79802 Was not'
t:'.
8, 219-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
.
unconstItutlonally va'
h
performed their own uniq f
f
.
gue as applied to two adult performers W 0
ue orm 0 entertamment at a club in Tampa).
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third persons who are present. As discussed earlier, the elimination of this
requirement is a necessary predicate to the successful prosecution of the
swingers. If that is the argument, the BSO and the prosecutor are not alone
in their belief that this prosecution is appropriate. In his concurring opinion
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Justice Scalia criticized the dissenters for
arguing that the sole purpose of a restriction upon nudity in public places is
to protect non-consenting parties from offense." Justice Scalia argued that:
Perhaps the dissenters believe that 'offense to others' ought to be the
only reason for restricting nudity in public places generally, but there
is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that Thoreavian
'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someoneelse' beau ideal-much less for thinking that it was written into the
Constitution. The purpose of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I
think, if 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosier
Dome to display their genitals to one another, even if there were not an
offended innocent in the crowd."

According to Justice Scalia, this is because "[o]ur society prohibits, and all
human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm
others but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, 'contra
bonos mores,' i.e., immoral.?"
Under those circumstances, "absent
specific constitutional protection for the conduct involved, the Constitution
does not prohibit them simply because they regulate 'morality.'?" As the
preceding demonstrates, Justice Scalia is confident that the states have the
power to enforce morality in all its forms, even in the absence of the need
to protect others. Justice Scalia's confidence aside, while the states have
assuredly attempted to exercise that power in the past, that practice begs
the question as to whether or not they legitimately had, and/or continue to
have, the power to prohibit sexual conduct when there is no harm to others
solely because the conduct is deemed by some to be immoral. As the
remainder of this article demonstrates, at least in the context of noncommercial sexual lifestyles, the states do not have that power.
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF ENFORCING SEXUAL MORALITY
Whether a state can coerce individuals to conform to certain sexual
norms is a long-standing issue of great debate." In the United States, the

73.

See Bames v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1991) (Scalia, 1., concurring).
/d.
75. Jd. at 575.
76. Jd.
77. See Harris v. Slate, 457 P.2d 638, 645·47 (Alaska 1969) {summarizing the general
debate).
74.
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more recent focus of that debate has been whether a zone of privacy exists
either in certain places, such as the sanctity of the home or the bedroom,"
or with respect to certain intimate and personal decisions."
Rather than
arguing that the swingers have a right to do what they do, this section
attempts to refocus the debate on the antecedent inquiry of whether
government has the power to regulate their conduct in the first instance.
This section begins by examining the limits of democratic governance in
general, as articulated by John Stuart Mill and H. L. A. Hart, and goes on to
respond to the argument of the defenders of governmental power to punish
individuals for acts that violate morality alone. It then examines how that
debate fits into the uniquely American theory of constitutional governance,
in which the constitutional distribution of powers represents the will of the
people as a whole.

A. MILL & HART ON LIBERTY
The modem debate on whether government can legitimately enforce
morality in and of itself begins with John Stuart Mill's essay, On Liberty."
In that essay, Mill argues that:
[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right."

This, he argues, is the essence of liberty in a free society. "The only
freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing OUf own good in our
owu way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it.,,", In other words, in the absence of the

78. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (l 969) (holding that states could not
purush the mere possession of obscenity In the privacy of one's own home); Paris Adult Theatre I
v, Slaton: ~13 U.S. 49; 67 (1973) ("Conduct or depictions of conduct that the state police power
can prohibit on a public street do not become automatically protected by the Constitution merely
because the condu:,t is moved to a bar or a 'live' theater stage."); Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257,
26~ {Fla. 1990) ( Although one may possess obscene material in one's home there is no
legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy in being able to patronize retail establishments for
the purpose of purchasmg such material.").
79. See, e.g., Griswold v, Connecticut, 38] U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965); Eiseustadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972); see also supra notes 6 and 8.

80. JOHN STUART Mn.i, On Liberty in THREE ESSAYS
81. !d. at 15.
82. !d. at 18.

(OxfordUuiv.

Press 1933).
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countervailing justification of preventing harm to others, the government
should not have the power to punish individuals simply because others
believe that their behavior is wrong or immoral. This does not mean that
others should or must sit idly by in silence if they disagree with the
conduct. As Mill stresses, "[h]uman beings owe to each other help to
distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the
former and avoid the latter.':" We can do so by "remonstrating with him,
or reasoning with him, persuading him, or entreating him. ,,84 It simply
means that it is inconsistent with the principles of individual liberty to use
government to coerce the individual because "a person's taste is as much
his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purseL]"85 and over one's
body and mind, the individual is the absolute sovereign."
Before society
can punish an individual through imprisonment, inflicting physical pain or
even death, deprive her of property, deny her the right to associate with
fami ly and friends or coerce her to change her behavior through the threat
of punishment, a compelling justification is needed. 87 Any society that
does not respect this basic doctrine of liberty is not free."
This liberty, however,
is not absolute.
There are limited
circumstances in which coercion is appropriate. According to Mill, "this
doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons.':" In other
words, "[t[hose who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against
external injury.':" As Mill's argument is premised on the belief that it is
best left to individuals to decide for themselves what is best, the individual
must have the capacity to make such decisions. Mill, therefore, recognized
that some degree of paternalism and coercion is necessary when an
individual is not fully capable of making decisions for him or herself.
While Mill did not write this doctrine into our constitution, the principles of
liberty he articulated
are deeply embedded
in our constitutional
jurisprudence and culture."

83. !d. at 93.
84. [d. at IS.
85. [d. at 103.
86. See JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 80, at IS.
87. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 21 (l963).
88. See JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 80, at 18.
89.
at 15,
90. [d,
91. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. Y. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of
liberty is the right to defme one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life."); see also Olmstead Y, United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
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Mill's doctrine was certainly not without its challengers."
As
demonstrated by Professor Hart, the arguments for the enforcement of
, ~ F'irst, proponen t s
morality can be summarized in three general categones.
of government enforcement rely upon examples of moral crimes, which we
supposedly would all agree should be punishable. If punishment based on
morality is permissible in those circumstances, then why not in others?
Second, the argument is made that the enforcement of morality is necessary
to preserve society. Lastly, it is argued that regardless of any instrumental
values served, the enforcement of morality is a good in and of itself. As
demonstrated by Professor Hart over thirty years ago, however, none of
these arguments sufficiently justify punishing an individual for immorality
alone.
I. History and Examples
To support the punishment of immorality, advocates of the
enforcement of moral crimes, from Lord Devlin to Justice Scalia, rely on
history and current practice to provide us with a list of offenses ostensibly
justified simply because they are immoral." This argument has two
possible interpretations. First, it can stand for the proposition that
punishment is permissible because we have in the past, and presently
continue, to inflict such punishment. Alternatively, the examples are held
out as crimes based solely upon an immorality that we should all agree are
desirable, and if we can punish morality in those circumstances, why not
others? As the following demonstrates, the first argument is woefully
inadequate, and the second does not withstand detailed scrutiny.
In challenging the principle that government can only punish
individuals in order to protect others, proponents of the state's power to

(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect .... They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts. their emotions and their sensations."); State v. Leone, 118 So. 2d 781,785 (Fla. 1960)
("[O]ne, if not the principal, reason for the existence of a democratic fcrm of government is to
guarantee to the individual freedom of action in those pursuits which do not harm his
neighbors.");
Commonwealth

Pavesich

v.

v. Bonadio,

New

England

Life

Ins,

Co"

122

415 A.2d 47, 49-51 (Pa, 1980); Gryczan

Ga.

190,

194-97

(1904);

v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 120-

21, 125 (Mont. 1997); see generally Note, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to
John Stuart Mill, 37 D, CHI, L. REV. 605 (1969-70).
92, See generally HON. SIR PATRlCKDEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); Lord
Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1962); JAMES F. STEPHEN,
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1967).
93.
94.

See H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 53-60 (1963),
See supra notes 73-76.
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punish for innnorality alone point to the existence of laws punishing
cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, sodomy, bigamy,
etc." One interpretation of the use of these examples is simply that,
because governments have and do punish immorality, it is proper for them
to do so. 1n fact, Justice Scalia suggests as much when he argued that
"[o]ur society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain
activities not because they harm others but because they are
considered ... immoral.':" The existence of such a practice, however, does
not of its own force cast doubt upon Mill's thesis. In conducting this
examination, we are employing what Hart referred to as critical morality or
"general moral principles used in the criticism of actual social institutions,"
including the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social
group." 1n other words, we are asking not whether such practices exist, but
the normative question of whether they should continue to exist-if they
are morally justified." As Justice Holmes once wrote:
lilt is revoltingto have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revoltingifthe
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simplypersistsfromblind imitationof the past."
The fact that states, such as Florida, may, in fact, have laws punishing
innnorality alone is no more a justification for that punishment than the
argument that slavery is legitimate because it is recognized in the text of
the U.S. Constitution or that it is permissible to discriminate based upon
race and gender because society and governments have a long history of
such discrimination. Therefore some other justification is necessary.
These examples can also be interpreted as a demonstration of the
practical conclusions of history and experience. 100 They are offered to
demonstrate our acceptance that punishment of such offenses is socially
valuable. This argument, however, depends upon whether the examples
offered are crimes justified by inunorality alone. It cannot be justified by
other principles. Leaving aside crimes based solely upon private sexual
immorality, Professor Hart's essay on Law, Liberty, and Morality carefully
demonstrates that the other examples, often used for this purpose, can in
fact be justified by principles other than morality. ioi For example, laws

95.
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
!d.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 20.
See id. at 20, 27-28.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
See H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 28·29.
See id. at 25-48.
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against drug use, euthanasia and suicide may be justified by reference to
paternalism-the protection of people against themselves. No matter how
strong our commitment to liberty may be, we may nonetheless believe that
there are certain circumstances in which individuals exercising free choice
may not be doing so:
without adequate reflection or appreciation of the consequences; or in
pursuit of merely transitory desires; or in various predicaments when

the judgment is likely to be clouded; or under irmer psychological
compulsion;or under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be
susceptibleof proofin a lawcourt.!'"
While Mill himself may cringe at expanding the range of circumstances
justifying paternalism, he did recognize that paternalism is, nonetheless,
essential in a free society for those not capable of making decisions for
lOJ
themselves.
Similarly, laws prohibiting bestiality or cockfighting can be
justified based upon a desire to prevent the suffering of, or harm to,
animals as opposed to the immorality of torture. 104
More importantly, prohibitions against bigamy, prostitution and
public indecency can be justified under nuisance principles. According to
Hart, "in a country where deep religious significance is attached to
monogamous marriage and to the act of solemnizing it, the law against
bigamy should be accepted as an attempt to protect religious feelings from
offence by a public act desecrating the ceremony."!"
Under those
circumstances, the bigamist is punished because of the "offensiveness to
others of his public conduct, not with the immorality of his private
conduct."!" The same can be said for public indecency laws. Even if
people personally believe in nudity and sodomy, they may still wish to
avoid being subjected to the nudity or sexual acts of others without their
consent.'?' This alternative justification for regulating indecent acts as
public nuisances was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, lnc.,'os in which the Court upheld a zoning ordinance
restricting the location of theaters exhibiting indecent speech, not because
such speech was immoral, but because of the harmful secondary effects,
such as increased criminal activity associated with those theaters. '09
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 33.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 34.
[d. at 41.

106.

H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 41,

107. See id. at 45 ("Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not immoral but if it
takes place in public it is an affront to public decency. ").
'
108. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
109. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc" 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); see also Young v.
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Likewise, England does not prohibit prostitution as a crime against
morality but prohibits public soliciting because it is considered an offensive
public nuisance to ordinary citizens. 110
The conclusion that there are alternative justifications for punishing
these offenses does not mean that the punishment of any of these offenses
is necessarily justified. We may, in fact, debate the appropriateness of
these principles in general, or as applied to specific situations. These
explanations, however, do demonstrate that there are alternative
justifications for punishing the list of "horribles" beyond the enforcement
of morality. Consequently, the examples do not demonstrate that history
and experience necessarily demonstrate the desirability of punishing
individuals for purely immoral behavior.
2. The Enforcement of Morality is Necessary to Preserve Society
Another argument raised in defense of punishing conduct solely
because it may be deemed immoral is that the enforcement of morality is
necessary to preserve society. According to Lord Devlin, "a recognized
morality is as necessary to society as, say, a recognized govemrnent.?'!'
Under this view, the breach of a moral principle is simply an offense
"against society as a whole."!" Consequently, even when there is no need
to protect others, "the suppression of vice is as much the law's business as
the suppression of subversive activities."!" As Professor Hart once again
demonstrates, there are two critical flaws to what Lord Devlin calls the
moderate thesis.'!'
First, the claim that the punishment of moral transgressions is
necessary to preserve society is susceptible to proof. If the enforcement of
morality is instrumental in preserving society, then there would be concrete
historical examples in which this occurred. However, aside from the
simple assertion that "the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage
of disintegration,"!" neither Lord Devlin nor any "reputable historian has

American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (recognizing the legislative finding that the
concentration of adult theaters causes deterioration of neighborhoods and increases in crime);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584-85 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (holding that
the regulation of nude dancing in a private establishment is permissible to avoid secondary
effects, such as prostitution, sexual assaults and other criminal activity).
l10. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 13.
Ill.
HON. SIR PATRICK DEVLIN,THE ENFORCEMENTOFMORALS]] (1959).
112. Id. at 6-7.
113. ld.a1IJ-14.
114. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at SO-52.
115. DEVLIN, supra note 111, at 13.
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maintained this thesis, and there is indeed much evidence against it.,,116 For
example, various European nations no longer punish acts of homosexuality,
and one cannot say that their societies have fallen into ruin. 117 The same
can be said for those states in the United States that have eliminated the
archaic sexual laws prohibiting acts such as sodomy.118 The loosening of
those moral norms did not destroy those states. Accordingly, those arguing
that the enforcement of morality is necessary should be required to bring
forward evidence to support that claim. Otherwise, the moderate thesis
fails to justify the enforcement of morality as such, and we are asked to
accept its conclusion on faith alone.
More importantly, the moderate thesis is based upon a questionable
conception of society. lnitially, even if the moderate thesis is accurate, we
may ask whether the current society is worth preserving.
If a society were mainly devoted to the cruel persecution of a racial or
religious minority, or if the steps to be taken [to preserve morality]
included hideous tortures, it is arguable that what Lord Devlin terms
the "disintegration" of such a society would be morally better than its
continued existence, and steps ought not to be taken to preserve

it.119

As our own history demonstrates, our society once demanded the
subjugation of blacks, permitted the virtual extermination of Native
Americans, required the subordination of women and coerced the
separation ofraces, all in the name of morality. Yet, few today would try
to defend those social orders, let alone seek to punish the "immoral"
actions taken to aid in their disintegration.
Correspondingly, the claim that the enforcement of morality is
necessary to preserve society fails because it conflates society with status
quo morality. According to Hart, the moderate thesis moves from the
acceptable idea that some shared morality is necessary for society "to the
unacceptable proposition that a society is identical with its morality as that
is at any given moment of its history, so that a change in its morality is
tantamount to the destruction of a society."l20
116.

H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 50.

t 17. See ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORlENTATION AND HUMAN RJOHTS 136 (1995).
118. See 1993 Nev. Stat 515; Commoowealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992);
Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Camphell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn.Ct.
App. (996).
119.

H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 19.

120. Id. at 51 (citation omitted). ln terms of linguistics, this is similar to France's treatment of
~e Fr~nch la~lguage,. which is considered virtually immutable because changes are seen as
m.consl~tent.~lth .the.ldea.of French, In contrast, the English language constantly changes while
stl!' mamtaunng Its Identity as English. See generally SrMON WINCHESTER, THE PROFESSOR
AND MADMAN: A TAlE OF MURDER AND INSANITY IN THE MAKING OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH
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For example, if the swingers' conduct in this case is not prohibited,
the moderate thesis argues that others may follow their example and engage
in sex with partners other than their spouse and/or engage in sex in front of
other consenting adults.
If enough people follow the swingers,
conventional morality might change. Even if enough people decide to join
the swingers' lifestyle, leading to a change in conventional morality, is this
the end of society? The answer is obviously no. We would still be a nation
governed under the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of the fifty
states; we would still be the same pluralist melting pot of racial and ethnic
groups; we would still be republicans, democrats and other political groups;
we would still be a nation that eats too much junk food, watches too much
television and surfs the Internet. The same can be said with respect to laws
prohibiting homosexuality. Unless one equates society with the status quo
morality, such as a Christian morality in which sexual relations are only
permissible between a man and woman in the bonds of a Church
sanctioned marriage, the only change wrought by permitting swingers to
swing or allowing gay men and women to love one another would be a new
moral order, not the end of society.!" As Professor Hart noted, some
would see this as "consistent not only with the preservation of a society but
with its advance."!" Consequently, unless there are other justifications for
preserving the existing moral order, it cannot be justified by a definitional
slight of hand or claiming that changing it will cause the sky to fall.
3. The Enforcement of Morality as an Independent Good
The last criticism of Mill's conception of liberty, what Hart describes
as the "extreme thesis," is both that the punishment of inuuorality is a good
in and of itself without regard to any instrumental ends, and also that
enforcement of moral good is merely of instrumental value.!" While the
following summary hardly does justice to the nuanced discussion provided
by Hart, a detailed discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice
it to say that Hart's argument can be summarized as follows. First, if the
purpose of enforcing a particular law is simply to coerce individuals to
DICTIONARY (1999).
121. See HL.A. HART, supra Dote 87, at 52.
No doubt it is true that if deviations from conventional
sexual morality are tolerated
by the law and come to be known, the conventional morality might change in a
permissive direction .... But even if the conventional morality did so change, the
society in question would not have been destroyed or "subverted,"

!d.
122. [d. at 52.
123. See id. at 54-55.
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behave in a particular manner against their will when their conduct does
not harm others and to force them to conform to some accepted form of
behavior, then we are not enforcing morality but taboo. Moral conduct
requires voluntary compliance. For example, if chastity is a moral ideal,
what is valuable is voluntary restraint, not submission to coercion.!" Legal
enforcement of morality by way of punishment or retribution for immoral
behavior makes sense when there is a victim because, under those
circumstances, "pain is morally the appropriate or 'fitting' return for moral
evil done."!"
When there is no victim, retribution "seems to rest on
nothing but the implausible claim that in morality two blacks make a white:
that the evil of suffering added to the evil of immorality as its punishment
makes a moral good."!" The extreme thesis has also been justified as the
moral majority's right to express its "intolerance, indignation, and
disgust."!"
Assuming that there is moral value in the denunciation of
immoral behavior, is infliction of pain and suffering necessary when the
public statements of disapproval would likewise communicate disapproval?
According to Professor Hart, arguments for more emphatic denunciation
simply become arguments for more effective means of instilling or
strengthening respect for morality. Once that argument is made, however,
punishment is no longer a good in and of itself but is merely an instrument
utilized in preserving the existing morality. [28 Ultimately then, both the
moderate and extreme theses either lose all rational substance or become
arguments for preservation of the moral status quo. Absent some general
principal justifying the preservation of any mle of social morality, a priori
claims for their preservation are dogmatic and incapable of critical
evaluation. 129
Critics of Mill, however, do not appear to go so far as to argue that
the enforcement of morality is justified because of divine commandment.
Instead, they argue that it is required by adherence to democratic
principles."? In other words, they claim it is the majority's right to impose
124. See id. at 57-58.
125. !d. at 58-59.
126. [d. at 60.

127.

DEVUN, supra note 111, at 17 (citation omitted).

128.

See H.L.A HART, supra note 87 at 66.

129. This m~y be acceptable for those who believe that there is no need to justify a particular
dioral and that It must b~ accepted without question or explanation. This article however is
Keeled to those who believe that "1' b h
ibl
"
"
I IS at POSSI e and necessary to critically evaluate claims
ab out mora Irty.
oV~~hef~~nSg~~)~HEN,
s?raLoothnc76, at 159 ("To be able to punish, a moral majority must be
.
.
":" see a so oc er v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Judges should respect "the right f
,"
.
.:
in law .... [and that] the word libe'
0 a ~J?rlty
to embody their optmons
rty ... 1S perverted when it IS held to prevent the natural
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its conception of morality upon the rest of society.!" However, as Hart
recognized, "[tjhe central mistake [in this argument] is a failure to
distinguish the acceptable principle that political power is best entrusted to
the majoriry from the unacceptable claim that what the majority do with
that power is beyond criticism and must never be resisted.":" While
democratic governments are committed to majority rule, this does not mean
that the majority is always right or always justified when it acts.!" While
this assumption is problematic under democratic theory in general, as the
following discussion demonstrates, it is particularly inappropriate under a
constitutional theory of government.
B. CONSENSUS CONSTITUTIONALISM
In addition to the objections arising from democratic theory and moral
philosophy, the punishment of conduct based solely on morality raises
concerns under our constitutional form of government. Unlike the British
tradition that produced Mill, Hart and Devlin, in which parliament is the
supreme political authority whose power is limited only by appeals to
external principles such as justice or natural law, the governments of the
states and of the United States are bound by written constitutions. Both the
U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of the states are based upon the
following "first principles": I) a constitution represents the will of the
people as a whole, and 2) powers granted by a constitution must, therefore,
either command the actual unanimous support of the people or be
recognized through mechanisms designed to approximate that consensus.!"
The argument, therefore, that a majority of the population can impose its
morality upon the rest of the nation or a state is only tenable if the
enforcement of morality is a power delegated to government by the people
as a whole.

These first principles flow from the uniquely American conception of
outcome of a dominant opinion"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 u.s. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a
prohibition of private homosexual sodomy enacted solely on "the presumed belief of a majority
of the electorate in [the jurisdiction] that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.").
131. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 124 (Mont. 1997) ("The State contends that 'societal
notions' of appropriate sexual conduct provide rational grounds for [the statute], and that this is
simply one of many areas of the law where legislative majorities have made moral choices
contrary to the desire of minorities. "); see also Robert H. Bark, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 28-29 (1971) (arguing that a political majority "surely
has as much control over the moral and aesthetic environment as it does over the physical, for
such matters may even more severely impinge upon [the majority's] gratifications").
132. H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 79.
133. See id. at 80-81.
134. See generally Ku, supra note 20.
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popular sovereignty.!" As part of the evolution of popular sovereignty in
Anglo-American law.!" the Founders flipped "the classic conception of
sovereignty on its head."!" No longer was government, be it King or
Parliament, the supreme power; rather, "the people are the only legitimate
fountain of power."!" The American conception of popular sovereignty
represented more than mere rhetoric, and steps were taken to turn the
fiction of popular sovereignty into practical reality.':"
The understanding that a constitution represents the written
embodiment of the people's will"? led to the requirement that constitutions
be adopted by the people rather than by the legislatures, which is originally
what had occurred in most states. For example, South Carolinians argued
that '''we have no such thing as a Constitution'; the document of 1778 was
'a mere cobweb,' since 'the principles of the Constitution are, at present
established no otherwise than by a simple Act of the Legislature. ",141
Having differentiated between what Bruce Ackerman characterizes as
"higher lawmaking" and "normal lawmaking,"!" Americans during the
founding era realized that the origins of these documents did not entitle
them to the status of a constitution. A constitution only gains the status of
fundamental law when it is adopted and alterable by the people themselves
and not some subset of them; as noted by Justice Haymond of the West
Virginia Supreme Court, "[u]nlike ordinary legislation, a constitution is
enacted by the people themselves."!" The history and development of
constitutional governance during the founding period make it clear that a
constitution does not derive its power and legitimacy from its title.':" "It is
not enough for the government or a group of citizens to simply call a
document or certain laws a constitution."!" "It is not the name, but the
authority which renders an act obligatory."!" "A constitution derives its

135.

For a more detailed discussion of this theory see Ku, supra note 20, at 547-74.

136. See

EDMUND

S.

MORGAN,

INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE

RISE OF POPULAR

SOVEREIGNTYIN ENGLAND AND AMERlCA 13-15 (1988).
137. Ku, supra note 20, at 549.
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison).
139. See MORGAN, supra note 136, at D-15 (describing popular sovereignty as a fiction in
both England and the American colonies).
140. See Ku, supra note 20, at 550-51.

14l. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLTC 1776-1787
(1969).

279 289
,

142. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1 FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991).
143. Lance v. Board of Educ. of the County of Roane, 170 S.E.2d 783, 793 (W Va. 1969)
(Haymond, J., dissenting).
.
144. See Ku, supra note 20, at 552.
145. !d.
146.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 249 (The Library of America 1984).
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fundamental, 'higher law' status only when it represents the will of the
supreme lawmaker-the people acting in their sovereign capacity."!"
While the preceding discussion on popular sovereignty and
constitutionalism is hardly controversial, defining who "We the People" are
has been more contentious. It is often suggested that a constitution must
reflect the will of the majority.':" In contrast, as I have argued elsewhere,
constitutional theory makes sense only if "We the People" means all of the
people to be governed by the constitution, not simply a portion of them'"
For example, as early as 1776 it was suggested that "'it is absolutely
necessary that the whole should be active in the matter, in order to
surrender their privileges in this case.... ' since it was the society itself
that was being constituted."!"
Another example is provided by the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which declares itself to be '''a social
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each
citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for
the common good. ",'SI
This conclusion is also supported by the Founders' concerns over
democratic despotism.
As any student of American history or
constitutional law knows, having rejected tyranny of the minority in the
form of monarchial or parliamentary rule from England, one of the
principal concerns of the Founders and purposes of constitutional
governance was to prevent democratic despotism.!" Madison, Wilson and
even anti-federalist Jefferson were concerned by a new form of tyrannytyrarrny of the majority.'? According to Madison, the Founders proposed
the uniquely American theory of constitutional governance as the remedy
to this evil.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republicanprinciple, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
147. See Ku, supra note 20, at 552.
148. See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM.L. REv. 457, 460 (1994); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 7576 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that judges should respect the right of the majority to
embody their opinions in the law and that "the word liberty ... is perverted when it is held to
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion").
149. See Ku, supra note 20, at 557-76.
150. WOOD, supra note 141) at 289.
] 51. [d. Similar sentiments were expressed by what has been called the "first proposal in
history for a written constitution based on inalienable natural rights." THE CM1BRIDGE HISTORY
OF POLTTICALTHOUGHT 1450-1700412 (J.H. Burns ed., 1991). The Leveller movement in 17th
century England proposed that every Englishman sign an "Agreement of the People" to "transfer
to his representatives the powers specifiied therein." MORGAN, supra note 136, at 72.
152. See Ku, supra note 20, at 563-65.
153. See id.
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views by regularvote .... When a majorityis includedin a faction,
the form of popular government,on the other hand, enables it to
sacrificeto its rulingpassionor interestboth the public good and the
rights of other citizens. To securethe public good and private rights
againstthe dangerof such a faction,and at the same time to preserve
the spirit and the form of popular~ovemrnent,is tben the great object
to which our inquiries are directed.

54

Because a majority can subvert the public good or invade the rights of
other citizens through normal politics, and potentially through higher
lawmaking, safeguards against majority tyranny are required in both. 155
However, even if we interpret the safeguards embodied in the U.S. and
subsequent state constitutions as limited to controlling the effects of
factions during normal lawmaking alone, to argue that those same factions
are entitled to that power outright during higher lawmaking is a nonsequitur.
The dangers presented by a group of people invading the rights of
others do not disappear in the context of creating or altering a constitution.
If anything, those dangers are greater in the absence of external limits, such
as those provided by a constitution. If the source of all political power does
not lie outside the people or with a portion of them, then it stands to reason
that its source is all of the people that are to be governed. "It is essential
to ... a [republican] government that it be derived from the great body of
the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of
it."I56 This then requires that the powers granted by a constitution actually
command the unanimous consent of the people, or as the Founders
provided, approximate actual consensus.':"
The constitutional preconditions for a democratic majority to speak
for the minority has been described as part of the moral reading of the
Constitution. ISS For example, Ronald Dworkin notes that before a group
can claim either that their right to self-determination or that the liberty of
the collective people has been infringed by limits upon their power to act
over an individual's objection,"? there must be "some connection between

154. THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 19-20 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
155. See Ku, supra note 20, at 565.
156. THE FEDERALISTNO. 39 112 (James Madison)(Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
See Ku, supra note 20, at 568-69.
Perhaps recognizing that actual consensus is
impractical, .th~Founders relied upon various «republican filters" or "auxiliary precautions," such
as superm~Jonty rule; representation, deliberation and popular ratification, to approximate
consensus III the adoption and amendment of the Constitution. See id. at 569-76.
158. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW; THE MORAL READlNG OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTETUTION (1996); see also Richards, supra note 6.
159. The claim must be one involving the rights of groups as opposed to individuals because
157.
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an individual and a group that makes it fair to treat him-and sensible that
he treat himself-as
responsible for what it does."!" This is what Professor
Dworkin calls "moral membership."!"
Moral membership requires, among
other things, equal concern for the interests of all members and moral
independence.!"
David Richards describes similar requirements, which he
refers to as the right to autonomy and moral equality.!"
Autonomy is
based on the assumption that all persons have the capacity to determine for
themselves the "object [of] one's life and the way it is lived."!" In other
words, "autonomy gives to persons the capacity to call their life their
own. ,,165 Moral equality requires that human institutions and relationships
"guarantee to each person equal concern and respect in exercising" their
capacity to determine what to do with their lives.!"
Obviously, the conditions for moral membership must exist during
normal and higher lawmaking. In the context of normal lawmaking, there
is a presumption that the constitution guarantees these conditions.!"
The
presumption is based on the belief that the constitution guarantees those
conditions by protecting certain liberties, such as freedom of speech, the
right to vote, equal protection and due process, to name a few, from
majorities during normal lawmaking.
During higher lawmaking,
however, nothing guarantees moral membership except strict equal concern
and respect for the autonomy of the other potential members of the polity.
Strict equal concern and respect for all individuals to determine what is
good for themselves necessarily requires unanimous agreement among
those individuals.

I"

While at one point in our history it may have been that those who
were allowed to constitute society and create constitutions, Christian,
European, white men, all believed that Christian morality should be
enforced even in issues such as sexuality, no such consensus exists today.
When such a consensus existed, if ever, it could reasonably be seen as a
desire to give the government the power to keep the individual on what all

no real argument can be made that a particular individual's moral freedom is diminished by
denying that individual the right to impose his or her values on others. See Steven G. Gey, Is
Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331, 366 (1995).
160.

DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 23.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
See id. at 25.
See Richards, supra note 6, at 964.
Id. at 965.
!d.
!d. at 968, 970-99.
See DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 23-24; see also Ku, supra note 20, at 559.
See Ku, supra note 20, at 559-60.
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agreed was the right moral path.
Enforcement under those circumstances is not contrary to individual
liberty.
Rather, because the individuals desired and agreed that
government should have that power, it supports those individual's wishes,
though perhaps not their immediate impulses. However, why would
individuals with diverse and even contradictory conceptions of the good
life allow others to tell them how to live their own lives? If they would not
have allowed others, even overwhelming numbers of others, to force those
views upon them in the absence of government, why would they agree to
allow those same individuals to do so through the mechanisms and power
of government?
This is not to say that individuals can and do have the right to
withdraw their consent as they see fit or when it serves their purpose. For
example, with the exception of the handful of individuals who believe that
government has no rightful place in any society and who may be treated as
existing outside of society, it is safe to say that we all agree that the states
have, and should have, the power to protect our health and safety. As the
enlightenment philosophers argued long ago, protecting ourselves from
others is the central purpose and benefit of societies and governments. We
exchange our unfettered right to injure others in order to be free from injury
ourselves. Similarly, we may even all agree that government should
exercise some degree of paternalism because we recognize that we may not
always have the capacity, either as a result of age or physiological
condition, to properly make decisions for ourselves. Having explicitly or
implicitly agreed that government should exercise such powers, short of
withdrawing ourselves from society, anyone of us could not legitimately
claim to exempt him or herself. Why would the other members of society
agree to such a result? Just as importantly, we may all agree that, under
certain conditions, we will accept the wishes of others, such as when the
government exercises the power to protect health and safety. The key,
however, is that we all agree to those circumstances and conditions. As
recognized by the Supreme Court of Alaska:
[o]n many subjects there is widespreadagreement and almost no
division of society about the propriety of legal control of human
behavior. Onother subjectsthereis suchsharpdivisionof opinionthat
only the pluralistic nature of our democratic system, in which the
sharedbelief in mutualtolerancetakes precedenceover differencesin
moral belief, prevents a destructive divisiveness in our social order.

169

With respect to the regulation of conduct when no one's rights are invaded,
169. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 645-46.
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no such consensus, either in theory or reality, exists,
Consequently, for government to legitimately exercise the power to
punish individuals for violations of morality alone, the power must be
granted by the consensus of the governed, Regardless, then, of what one
thinks of Mill's doctrine, we may question whether a consensus exists
delegating to government the power to regulate individual conduct that
does not invade the rights of others under the first principles of
constitutional law.!" While that specific power is not expressly delegated
to either the states or the federal government, the remaining section
examines both whether it falls within the scope of a power that we would
all agree should be exercised by the state, namely the police power, and
also what role the judiciary should play in making that determination.
IV, LIMITS OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE
The issue remains whether the people as a whole delegated to the
slates the power to regulate conduct that does not invade the rights of
others. While the state constitutions are based upon the same theory of
governance as the U.S, Constitution, they differ in form. 171 Whereas the
U.S. Constitution enumerates the specific powers that the national
government can exercise, most state constitutions generally delegate to the
legislature the "legislative power."!" It has been argued that given this
delegation, the state legislative power is absolute and limited only by
explicit prohibitions in the state and U,S, Constitutions.!"
This
understanding, however, has been challenged from the beginning. Justice
Chase, in his now famous opinion in Calder v, Bull,174 stated that
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it
is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be
expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the
State. The people oj the United States erected their Constitutions, or
Jorms oj government, to establish justice, to promote the general
welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons
and property from violence. The purposes for which men enter into
society will determine the nature and terms oj the social compact; and

170.
position
whether
171.
172.

Despite the temptation to do so, it would appear to be unwise to adopt the reductionist
employed by the Supreme Court in Bowers and ask the ultimate, specific question of
a consensus exists for government to punish sodomy.
See generally Ku, supra note 20, at 569-72.
See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1; see generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATTSE ON

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS WHICH

REST UPON THE LEGISLATrvE

UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
173. See COOLEY, supra note 172, at 70-99.
174. 3
(1 Dall,) 386 (1798),
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as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide
what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative
power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows
from the very nature of our free Republican governments.... There
are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do, without

exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free
governments, which will determine and over-rule an
apparent andjlagrant ahuse of legislative power ... , An [act] of the
Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great jlrst
principles of the social compact, cannot he considered a rightful
exercise of legislative authority.!"
Republican

Accordingly, Justice Chase believed that limits on governmental power are
inherent in the delegation of power itself and that guidance can be found in
the reasons people enter into society, the establishment of justice,
promotion of the general welfare, securing liberty and protecting their
persons and property from violence. 176
In addition to explicit limitations imposed by state bills of rights or
constitutional amendments, the state's legislative power has, in practice,
been considered co-terminus with the police power."? Defining the outer
limits of legislative power with the police power provides some limit to the
power of a state, while simultaneously serving many of the goals
recognized by Justice Chase. In its broadest sense, the police power of a
State
embraces its whole system of internal regulation, by which the state
seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against the State, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens

with citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood
which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to
each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably
consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.l "
In other words, the police power of tbe state "extends to the protection of
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection
of all property within the State."!" As such, the police power appears to be
consistent with Mill's doctrine-the
power to protect individuals from the
invasion of their rights by others.l'" Moreover, as broad as the states'
powers are under the police power, the protection of morals alone does not

175. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (l Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (emphasisadded).
(I Dall.) at 388.
177. See Limiting the State's Police Power, supra note 91, at 608.
178. COOLEY, supra note 172, at 829.
179. Id. at 831 (internal quotation omitted).
180. See infra notes J 84-85.

176. SeeCalder,3 U.S.
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appear to be included. While the police power has been described in dicta
as the power to protect public health, safety and morals." 'I this can be
interpreted to mean nothing more than the uncontroversial recognition that
when laws protect individuals from the invasion of their rights by others,
there is a moral component to that protection.l'" As such, the preservation
of morals when no one's rights are invaded is not within the state's police
power.
A. A LOCHNER ASIDE

As a preliminary matter, any mention of judicially imposed limits
based upon the police power of the state raises the specter of criticism of
judicial activism and of Lochner v. New York,'" in which the Court
invalidated a state effort to pass laws regulating the working conditions of
bakers.!" For most lawyers, judges and legal scholars, the Supreme
Court's decision in Lochner and its subsequent rejection is to the legal
profession what the Vietnam war is to the U.S. military-a difficult and
troubling precedent cautioning future action. Like the Vietnam war,
however, it is also a lesson that can be read too broadly. First, regardless of
what one thinks about the Court's articulation of the right to freedom of
contract, the analytical framework used by the Court, examining whether a
particular exercise of legislative authority could be considered police power
legislation, was well accepted by even the dissenters and was employed by
the state courts as well. ISS Second, the disagreement in Lochner was not
over what Justice Holmes suggested, whether the Court could force a
laissez-faire economic theory upon the nation.!" but over whether

181. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392 (1898) ("While this court has held ... that the
police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation, it may be
lawfully resorted to for the purpose of preserving the public health, safety or morals.") (citations
omitted).
182. See Gey, supra note 159, 33] ("This does not mean that government action may never
include a moral component. To some extent, government action will always be based on notions
of morality, and it would be foolish to dispute that morality enters into the decision-making
processes of political policy makers.").
183. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
184. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 45 (1993) ("The period is often
thought to symbolize an unjustified form of judicial 'activism': judicial intrusions into the
democratic process without adequate support from the text and history of the Constitution.").
185. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: rns RISE AND DE"MlSE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 129-33 (1993).
186. See id. at 131 ("'[T]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain,' that is, Iaissez-faire, and 'a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory. "'); see also Lochner, 198 U,S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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maximum hour laws actually protected health and safety. 187 In thiIS respect,
the Court's conclusion is clearly subject to criticism for ignoring the very
real connection between maximum work hour laws and health and safety."
Lastly, with respect to the concept of freedom of contract, the Lochner era
decisions are erroneously based upon status quo neutrality or, in other
words, "a particular conception of neutrality, one based on existing
distribution of wealth and entitlements.?'" Maximum hour and wage laws
were considered unconstitutional "class legislation" because they altered
existing economic rights, which were seen as natural, in favor of one group
at the expense of another."? The subsequent rejection of Lochner is,
therefore, also understood as a recognition that existing property and
economic rights are themselves created and maintained by law,": and
legislatures, therefore, should have greater freedom in reallocating those
rights.
While we may disagree with the Supreme Court's health and safety
conclusion and the economic premise in Lochner, the underlying analytical
framework, which examines whether a legislative act falls within the police
power as an effort to promote health and safety, has never been rejected.
Even in rejecting Lochner and its progeny, Justice Stone made clear in the
famous Carolene Products' footnote 4 that, while the judiciary would defer
to the legislature with respect to economic legislation, searching judicial
inquiry would be appropriate in other circumstances.!"
As one
commentator noted, "the Court did not cut back on Lochner by
distinguishing between reasonable and arbitrary state regulations ...
instead, it distinguished in the Carolene Products case between economic
and noneconomic rights, giving government plenary power to regulate the
former and little power over the latter."!" In fact, the need to examine
whether a particular legislative act is within the constitutional grant of
power received renewed attention even in the economic realm following
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. LopezI" in which the
Court invalidated legislation as beyond the grant of Congress's power

See GIlLMAN, supra note 185, at 128-34.
188. See id. at 128-33.
189. SUNSTEIN, supra note 184, at 45.
190. See id. at 40; see also GILLMAN, supra note 185, at 132-33.
191. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 184, at 58 ("We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws
are not made by nature. They are made by human beings.").
192. United Stale, v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
187.

193.

WTLUAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRlNCIPLE TO

JUDlClAL DOCTRINE 200 (1988) (interoal citation omitted).
194. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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under the Commerce Clause.!"
Consequently, despite the Court's
experience with Lochner, determining whether a legislative act is
consistent with the protection of public order, health and safety remains,
and should remain, a viable and important constitutional inquiry.
B.

DEFINING

THE POLICE POWER

I. The General Framework
The analytic framework for determining whether a statute is a valid
exercise of the police power is well established. In general, for a statute to
be a valid exercise of the police power, it must benefit the public generally
and not simply a particular segment of the public, and the means must not
unduly oppress individual liberty.!" As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
[T]ojustify the State in thus interposingits authorityin behalf of the
public,it must appear,first,that the interestsof the publicgenerally,as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for

the accomplishmentof the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

197

The underlying justification for these limits was the Madisonian aversion
to allowing government to become the tool of factional or class politics.!"
"The common assumption was that the rights of nonmajorities would be
best protected not by having judges divine a set of 'preferred freedoms'
and then evaluate whether a state's interest was sufficiently 'compelling,"?
but by limiting the proper scope of legislation to generally applicable laws
that serve a genuine public purpose.!" A state's effort to regulate the
sexual conduct of individuals when that conduct does not invade the rights
of others fails to satisfy these requirements of the police power. In the
absence of harm to others, the regulation of individual conduct does not
benefit the public generally. Instead, it impermissibly benefits a particular
class of citizens at the expense of another. As the following demonstrates,
this conclusion is consistent with the decisions of other states as well as
with existing Florida privacy law.

195.
Flores,
section
196.
197.
198.
199.

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 567 (1995); see a/so City of Boerne v.
117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164-65 (1997) (examining whether Congress' exercise of power under
five of the Fourteenth Amendment is within the power granted to Congress).
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
!d.
See GiLLMAN, supra note 185, at 49.
[d. at 54.
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2. State Examples
Viewing the regulation of non-commercial sexuality in the absence of
harm to others as outside the scope of the police power helps to explain and
provide coherence to many state court decisions generally lumped under
the right of privacy. The clearest example of this approach is provided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Bonadioi'" which
struck down a Pennsylvania law prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse.i"
Deviate sexual intercourse was defined as "per os or per anus between
human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual
intercourse with an animal.'?" The Commonwealth argued that the statute
was a valid exercise of the police power over defendants who were arrested
at an "adult" pornographic theater.?" Instead of attempting to determine
whether deviate sexual intercourse could be considered under some
conception of privacy, the court examined whether the regulation of such
conduct fell within the police power.?" Initially, it noted that "the police
power is not unlimited,"'o, and that "[t]he threshold question in determining
whether the statute in question is a valid exercise of the police power is to
decide whether it benefits the public generally.Y"
While the court noted
that a public benefit can be found "in protecting the public from inadvertent
offensive displays of sexual behavior, in preventing people from being
forced against their will to submit to sexual contact, in protecting minors
from being sexually used by adults, and in eliminating cruelty to animals,"
the same cannot be said for regulating the private conduct of consenting
adults."? In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly stated that, with
respect to sexual morality, Mill's doctrine articulates the proper scope of
the state's police power.i" In response to the moral majority's right to
enforce its moral norms, the court responded that "no sufficient state
interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a particular belief is
followed by a number of people, or even a majority."'09 Mere punishment
for "what many believe to be abhorrent crimes against nature and perceived
sins against God, is not properly in the realm of the temporal police

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
See Pennsylvania v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47,48-50 (Pa. 1980).
Id. at 48-49 n.l (emphasis added).
See id. at 49.
See id. at 49-52.
!d. at 49.
!d.
Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 49.
See id. at 50-52.
!d. at 50.
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power.'?" As recognized by the New York Court of Appeals, this is an
issue of private as opposed to public morality.'"
Similarly, in direct contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers, the Supreme Court of Georgia struck down Georgia's sodomy

laws under the state constitution's Due Process Clause.?" According to the
court, the liberty protected by the due process clause of the state
constitution "includes 'the right to live as one will, so long as that will does
not interfere with the rights of another or the public."?" The court found
that this principle helped to explain its privacy decisions in areas involving
sexuality.
Implicit in our decisions curtailing the assertion of a right to privacy in

sexual assault cases involving sexual activity taking place in public,
with those legallyincapableof givingconsent,performedin
exchangefor money,or performedwith force and againstthe will of a
participant, is the determination that the State has a role in shielding

performed

the public from inadvertent

exposure to the intimacies of others, in

protecting minors and others legally incapable of consent from sexual
abuse, and in preventing people from beingforced to submit to sex acts
against their will. 214

In contrast, "the sodomy statute's raison d'etre can only be to regulate the
private sexual conduct of consenting adults," and "[a]dults who 'withdraw
from public gaze,' to engage in private unforced sexual behavior are
exercising a right 'embraced within the right of'personal Iiberty.v'i'P
In addition to concluding that the concept of liberty included the right
to engage in sexual activity that does not invade the rights of others, the
court concluded that the prohibition of such conduct was not within the
scope of the state's police power.?" While the court recognized that the
police power provides the state with the ability to legislate "for the
protection of the citizen's lives, health, and property, and to preserve good
order and public morals," sexual conduct does not fall within the reach of
the police power in the absence of harm to others."? According to the
court, before a state can validly exercise the police power on behalf of the

!d.
2t I. See also People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936,940-41 (N.Y App. Div. 1980) (concluding
that regulation of consensual sodomy is not within the scope of the police power, as there was no
threat or harm to the public or even public morality as opposed to private morality).
212. See Powell v, State, 510 S.E.2d 18,21-24, 26 (Ga. t998).
213. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
214. ld. at 24 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
215. !d. at 24-25.
216. Seeid. at25.
217. Id.
210.

ST THOMASLAWREVIEW

34

[Vol. 12

public, the interests of the public generally must require such
interference.:" This requirement is clearly satisfied when an act invades
the rights of others, but when "the only possible purpose for the statute is to
regulate the private conduct of consenting adults, the public gains no
benefit, and the individual is unduly oppressed by the invasion .... [T]he
legislation exceeds the permissible bounds of the police power.'?"
Consequently, in the absence of an invasion of the rights of others, the fact
that a majority believes that the act is repugnant does not bring it within the
state's police power.
Moreover, not only have courts concluded that the police power does
not include the power to enforce moral norms upon individuals whose
conduct does not harm others, just the opposite is required. Both the
Supreme Court of Montana and the Tennessee Court of Appeals have
stated that:
[wjith respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from
interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to
enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm

others.i"

A similar sentiment was expressed by the Supreme Court of Alaska: "[W]e
should avoid the fallacy that a rule of morality is necessarily a rule of law,
or that the morality of some groups is, without more, entitled to legal
enforcement.,,22l It is, therefore, incumbent on courts to uphold the limits
of goverrunental power delegated under their constitution. As such, the
courts in both cases held that the states did not have the power to regulate
non-commercial, consensual adult sexual activity.'22 These decisions
clearly demonstrate that the police power of a state does not include the
power to enforce the majority's moral norms against individuals unless the
conduct engaged in invades the rights of others. In fact, the police power
of the state requires courts to ensure that individuals are free from
interference in defining and pursuing their own morality.

218. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at25.
219. See id.
220. G:Yczan v. State, 942 P.2d lt2, 125 (Mont. 1997) (quoting Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 2'0, 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)); see also Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 265
(Tenn. Ct. App. t996).
22 t. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska 1969).
222. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 125-26; Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 266.
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3. Florida Law
The conclusion that the regulation of sexual activity that does not
invade the rights of others is not a valid exercise of the police power is also
consistent with Florida law. Consistent with the general limits of the police
power articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawton,'" Florida law
provides that, to exercise the police power in a manner detrimental to an
individual or class, "it must first be clear that the purpose to be served is
not merely desirable but one which will so benefit the public as to justify
interference with or destruction of private rights.""4 Additionally, "[tjhis
means that the interference with or sacrifice of the private rights must be
necessary, i.e. must be essential, to the reasonable accomplishment of the
desired goaL,,225 Accordingly, for Florida to be able to prohibit the
swingers' conduct, there must be a benefit to the public generally, and the
means employed must be essential to accomplishing the state's goals.
Implicit in the differing conclusions reached in Florida's privacy
decisions involving sexuality is the conclusion that the public is only
benefited when such prohibitions prevent the invasion of the rights of
another. Three cases in particular illustrate this point. In Jones v. State/"
the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute prohibiting unlawful carnal
intercourse with minors, even when the conduct is consensua1.'" In B.B. v.
State,'" the Supreme Court of Florida held that the same statute was
unconstitutional when applied with respect to consensual intercourse
between two sixteen-year-olds.F" In contrast, the Supreme Court in J.A.S.
v. State'" concluded that the statute could be applied against two fifteenyear-old boys who engaged in consensual sex with two twelve-year-old
girls."! According to the court in Jones, a minor's consent was irrelevant
because "'any type of sexual conduct involving a child constitutes an
intrusion upon the rights of that child, whether or not the child
consents ... [and] [s]ociety [therefore] has a compelling interest in
intervening to stop such misconduct."?" The same was true in JA.S. The
state has a compelling interest in protecting younger teenagers, both from

223. See generally Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-38 (1894).
224. State v. Leone, 118 So. 2d 781,784 (Fla. 1960).
225. Id. at 784-85.
226. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
227. See Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086-87 (Fla. 1994).
228. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
229. See B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256,257-60 (Fla. 1995).
230. 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
231. SeeJ.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. 1998).
232. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1086 (quoting Shmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410-11 (Fla. 1991».
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older teenagers and also from their own immaturity?" However, when
consensual sexual activity occurs between teenagers of the same age, the
state is not protecting the minors but is instead using the law as a means of
punishing the minors.?" In that situation, the "crux of the State's interest is
in protecting the minor from the sexual activity itself," which the court
concludes is beyond the state's power?"
Consequently, even Florida's
privacy decisions with respect to the sexual conduct of minors support the
conclusion that the state's police power can only be exercised to prevent
conduct which invades the rights of others.
With respect to Florida's law on lewdness, it would appear that the
invasion of the rights of a third party is not only an element of the law.i"
but is essential to the law's constitutionality.
In the absence of injury to
third parties, regulation of individual conduct cannot be considered to be
for the public benefit, and therefore, Florida does not have the power to
enact such legislation. The conclusion is the same regardless of whether or
not a defendant can be characterized as having a legitimate or reasonable
expectation of privacy. While we may all agree that government should
protect individuals from having their rights invaded by others, we have not
agreed to give the government the power to act absent that justification. So
long as their actions do not invade the rights of others, the swingers can
continue to swing.
V. CONCLUSION
Years ago, H.L.A. Hart noted that "[t]he greatest of dangers ... [is]
not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority,
but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought
unobjectionable that they should do SO.,,237 Today, this danger can clearly
be seen in efforts to enforce particular conceptions of sexual morality upon
individuals whose views and practices may be contrary to that morality.
While some may question the conclusion that a majority, and even an
overwhelming majority, is without the power to impose its particular
morality upon the rest of society, it is absolutely consistent with consensus
constitutionalism. In constitutional democracies like ours, government can
only legitimately exercise the powers that society, as a whole, delegates to
it.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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SeeJA.S., 705 So. 2d at 1386.
See B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
See id. at 259.
See supra Part IT.A.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 77-78.
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In theory, our constitutions represent the consensus agreements of we
the people. As this article demonstrates, in such a system, it is incumbent
on the judiciary to determine whether the people as a whole have delegated
a power to the government before determining whether an exercise of such
power conflicts with a recognized right. A negative answer with respect to
the former question eliminates the need to address the latter. In contrast,
requiring the individual challenging the government action to demonstrate
that his or her conduct falls within some category of special rights assumes
that government has such a power. While that assumption may be
warranted in some circumstances, in the case of the swingers in Florida, it
is not.

